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In 2010, activity declined slightly, by -0.1%, reflecting a negative carry-over effect deriving 
from the intense contraction in 2009. That said, the Spanish economy commenced its re-
covery in 2010, with a slight increase in activity in each quarter except for the third. As 
seen in Chart 5.1, the upturn in 2010 was modest in comparison with the loss of output 
during the recession: as against a cumulative decline in activity of almost 5 percentage 
points (pp) in 2008 and 2009, in 2010 activity recovered by barely 0.6 pp. In 2011 Q1 this 
process of slow growth continued with output growth of 0.3%. The outlook for 2011 and 
2012, according to the Spanish economic projections report published by the Banco de 
España in March, is one of continuation of this gradual recovery, although the pre-crisis 
level of output will still not have been reached by the end of 2012.
This pace of recovery is also slower than the one observed following the recession of the 
early 1990s. Among other factors, this is due to the negative performance projected for gov-
ernment consumption and housing investment in 2011 and 2012, in comparison with 1995 
and 1996, as a result of the greater intensity of the fiscal and real-estate-market adjustment 
in the present crisis. By contrast, the recovery in government consumption is not projected to 
be very different in the next two years from that seen in the mid-1990s and the contribution of 
net external demand to output is projected to be even higher in 2011 and 2012, despite the 
absence of the exchange rate instrument. The recovery in activity is therefore expected to be 
gradual as a result of the adjustment of the imbalances accumulated during the upturn and of 
the fiscal deterioration that emerged during the crisis, which are currently manifest in the need 
to reduce public demand to make it more consistent with the resources available, while the 
possibilities of an expansion in private demand are limited by the high indebtedness. In this 
process, the improvement in net exports will support growth and permit a reduction in the 
recourse to external saving. The slowness of the pick-up in activity also contrasts with the 
stronger recovery discernible in the euro area. Although the depth of the recession in the euro 
area was similar to that in Spain, in terms of the decline in output, there was a significant in-
crease in activity in the euro area in 2010, which is expected to continue in 2011 and 2012.
The severity of the recession and slowness of the recovery have resulted in substantial excess 
capacity in the Spanish economy, which is manifest in a very large negative output gap and 
high rate of unemployment, and have had a significant negative impact on potential output.
The strains in the euro area financial markets stemming from the sovereign debt crisis were 
reflected in a significant rise in the cost of financing for general government and credit in-
stitutions, and in greater difficulty for the latter to obtain access to wholesale markets. The 
strains reached a peak in November. Subsequently, the risk premiums of resident issuers 
have tended to fall, within a context of marked volatility, although they remain relatively 
high (over 200 basis points (bp) in May 2011).
The cost of bank financing for households and non-financial firms also increased from 
mid-2010 (see Chart 5.2). This was the result of the increase in interbank yields and, from 
early 2011, of a progressive passing through of the rise in the cost of financial institutions’ 
liabilities to the margins they apply to their transactions with customers. Credit standards 
remained restrictive and, according to the Bank Lending Survey (BLS), tightened further, 
albeit moderately, in 2010 Q2, basically as a consequence of the financial strains. Subse-
quently they have remained unchanged, except in 2011 Q1, when they tightened again 
1  Monetary and financial 
conditions
The financial strains raised 
the cost of financing 
for general government 
and credit institutions... 
... and contributed to a certain 
tightening of the financing 
conditions for firms and 
households, which were also 
affected by the increase in 
market interest rates
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somewhat in the household financing segment. The turmoil also led to a rise in the cost for 
non-financial firms of issuing fixed and variable-income securities.
The price of financial and real assets declined in 2010 (the IBEX 35 index fell by 17.4% and 
the value of housing by 3.5%, which in the latter case made a total fall from the peak val-
ues recorded in early 2008 of 13% in nominal terms and 18% in real terms). This also 
contributed to the tightening of financial conditions, although the depreciation of the nom-
inal effective exchange rate had the opposite effect. In the first few months of 2011, stock 
markets recovered, growing by 7.5% in the period to 6 May 2011, but the price of housing 
fell by a further 2.6% in Q1, making a total fall of 20% in real terms, and the euro appreci-
ated significantly.
Against this background, non-financial private sector debt continued to reflect a pattern 
of slow deleveraging in the case of households and selective deleveraging in that of 
firms. Household liabilities remained practically unchanged in 2010, although they have 
contracted slightly since the beginning of 2011, while in the case of non-financial corpo-
The decline in the price of 
financial and real assets also 
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exchange rate depreciation 
had the opposite effect
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rations bank lending was reduced in activities linked to the real-estate sector, while its 
growth was close to zero or slightly positive in other activities. The developments in bank 
lending and in indebtedness in general are analysed in detail by sector in Chapter 6 of 
this Report.
Despite the stagnation of household liabilities in the last few years, the household debt 
ratio has barely fallen from the high levels it reached in 2007, owing to the slackness of the 
sector’s income. However, the associated debt burden continued to fall in 2010 as a whole, 
thanks to the decline in the average annual cost of outstanding debt, although interest 
rates began to increase in the final months of the year. In the case of non-financial corpo-
rations, the recovery in corporate earnings contributed to a larger – albeit moderate – cut 
in the debt ratio, and also in the associated debt burden, which was driven by the decline 
in the average cost of outstanding debt. That said, the corporate sector remains highly 
leveraged, although the situation varies from sector to sector (see Box 6.2).
A fiscal consolidation process was initiated in 2010. This process began with the approval 
in December 2009 of the State budget for 2010 and was reaffirmed by the February 2010 
Stability Programme Update (SPU), which set a path to cut the deficit to 3% of GDP in 
2013. In May 2010, as a consequence of the European sovereign debt crisis, the Spanish 
government decided to speed up the consolidation process, with more of the adjustment 
to be made in 2010 and 2011, while maintaining the target of a budget deficit of 3% of GDP 
in 2013. The deficit cutting path was thus adjusted to 9.3% of GDP in 2010 (as against the 
9.8% initially planned), 6% in 2011 (as against the target of 7.5% of GDP established in the 
January 2010 SPU) and 4.4% in 2012 (as against the previous level of 5.3%). 
The provisional budget outturn data for general government as a whole for 2010 show an 
improvement of 0.1 pp on the target of 9.3% of GDP, which would mean that the deficit was 
cut by almost 2 pp with respect to 2009 (see Table 5.1). This result was based on an in-
crease of 1 pp in the revenue-to-GDP ratio and a fall in the spending ratio of 0.8 pp. The 
adjustment was focused on capital expenditure, which was reduced by 1 pp of GDP, and 
final consumption expenditure (compensation of employees and inputs), which contributed 
0.5 pp. Other spending items, such as subsidies and current and capital transfers moder-
ated significantly, but were higher than initially planned. By contrast, social benefits rose by 
0.7 pp of GDP, given the inertia of spending on pensions and the high degree of persistence 
of spending on unemployment benefits. On the revenue side, the strong growth in indirect 
taxes (in particular, in VAT receipts) offset the less dynamic performance of direct taxes and 
social contributions. Notable by sector were the improved performance of central govern-
ment in relation to the target set, the disappearance of the traditional social security surplus 
and the failure by regional and local governments to comply with their targets.
Partly on account of this large deficit, public debt increased significantly, from 53.3% of 
GDP in 2009 to 60.1% in 2010, although, given the favourable starting situation it re-
mained well below the EU average. The increase in debt was due to the high budget defi-
cit, which was partly offset by the effect on the debt ratio of positive nominal GDP growth 
(0.5 pp of GDP) and by the deficit-debt adjustments (2 pp of GDP). The interest burden 
associated with this level of debt reached 1.9% of GDP in 2010, increasing by somewhat 
more than 0.1 pp of GDP with respect to 2009, owing to the larger volume of outstanding 
debt, despite a slight fall in the implicit financing rate. In the coming years, given the ex-
pected trend in public debt and interest rates, the interest burden will continue to rise rela-
tive to GDP, which will increase the magnitude of the fiscal drive needed to reduce the 
budget deficit.
... the household debt ratio 
barely changed, owing to the 
unfavourable performance of 
household income, while that 
of firms fell slightly
2 Economic policies
2.1 FISCAL POLICY
2010 marked the 
commencement of a 
vigorous fiscal adjustment, 
which has gone beyond 
the initial plans
The provisional results for 
2010 show that the budget 
deficit targets were achieved 
– an important milestone for 
the credibility of the rest of the 
consolidation path
Public debt increased 
significantly in 2010, to 60% 
of GDP, which is still well 
below the EU average
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The structural improvement in government finances more than offset the negative con-
tribution of the business cycle and the interest burden (see Chart 2.2). Primary structural 
spending was reduced by somewhat more than 1 pp of GDP, basically due to the with-
drawal of the stimulus measures that affected 2009 (see Table 5.2), while tax rises and 
the withdrawal of temporary revenue-side measures contributed 2 pp of GDP. Despite 
this improvement, the structural government deficit remained high in 2010, at around 
8% of GDP.
The budget results for 2010 show that the main risks in future will be associated, first, 
with the behaviour of regional and local governments. In this respect, fiscal discipline 
among regional and local governments, in particular the former, depends crucially on 
strict compliance with a measure adopted in 2010: approval by the Fiscal and Finan-
cial Policy Council of the criteria to be followed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Finance when authorising regional government debt operations during the period 
2010-13. These criteria lay down two general rules: the indebtedness of regional gov-
ernments must be in line with the deficit-reduction path; and no operation will be au-
thorised that increases the level of indebtedness of a regional government until the 
Fiscal and Financial Policy Council has issued a favourable report on its rebalancing 
plan. These criteria were applied for the first time in November 2010 and affected two 
The adjustment of the budget 
deficit in 2010 was essentially 
structural
The budget results for 2010 
show that the main risks of 
deviation are associated, first, 
with the behaviour of regional 
and local government...
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1  NON-FINANCIAL RESOURCES 39.4 40.4 41.1 37.1 34.7 35.7
    Current resources 38.6 39.7 40.6 36.9 34.7 35.7
        Taxes on products and imports 12.2 12.3 11.7 9.9 8.7 10.1
        Taxes on income and wealth 10.9 11.7 12.9 10.8 9.6 9.4
        Social contributions 12.9 12.9 13.0 13.2 13.3 13.2
        Other current resources (a) 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.1
    Capital resources (b) 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.2 -0.1 0.0
2  NON-FINANCIAL USES (c) 38.4 38.4 39.2 41.3 45.8 45.0
    Compensation of employees 10.0 10.0 10.2 10.9 11.9 11.7
        Other ?nal consumption expenditure 7.6 7.6 7.7 8.2 8.8 8.5
        Social bene?ts other than social transfers in kind 11.6 11.5 11.6 12.4 14.5 15.2
        Subsidies 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
        Interest (c) 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.9
        Other transfers 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.9 1.7
    Capital uses 4.9 5.1 5.4 5.4 5.9 4.9
        Gross capital formation 3.6 3.7 4.0 3.9 4.4 3.7
    Other capital uses (d) 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.2
3  NET LENDING (+) OR NET BORROWING (-) (c) (3=1-2) 1.0 2.0 1.9 -4.2 -11.1 -9.2
MEMORANDUM ITEMS:
    Final consumption 18.0 18.0 18.4 19.5 21.1 20.8
    Primary surplus 2.8 3.7 3.5 -2.6 -9.4 -7.3
    Gross debt (c) 43.0 39.6 36.1 39.8 53.3 60.1
MAIN GENERAL GOVERNMENT NON-FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS TABLE 5.1
% of GDP 
SOURCE: Structural indicators of the Spanish economy and the EU, Banco de España.
a Includes gross operating surplus.
b The negative sign in 2009 is due to the adjustment for uncertain revenue included with that sign in these resources.
c According to the Excessive De?cit Procedure methodology.
d Includes net acquisitions of no???nancial non-produced assets. 
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regional governments, Murcia and Castile-La Mancha, which had to specify their man-
datory adjustment plans. Likewise, a measure was approved in 2010 that only allows 
local governments to seek long-term public or private credit in 2011 if their debt does 
not exceed 75% of their revenues and the credit is to be used for investment already 
in progress, or else for co-funded projects. Also, homogeneous regional government 
data on the budget outturn for the previous quarter were published for the first time in 
December 2010. This practice, which has continued at the beginning of 2011 and will 
be repeated on a quarterly basis, amounts to a significant advance in terms of trans-
parency.
The magnitude, nature and composition of the spending cuts needed to achieve the tar-
gets set mean that their fulfilment is uncertain. First, a significant proportion of public 
spending in Spain is associated with items that have traditionally displayed significant 
upward inertia, such as spending on education, health and pensions. Second, spending 
on unemployment benefits, against a background of very high rates of unemployment, 
amounted to 3 percentage points of GDP in 2010, the highest level in the euro area. The 
saving measures proposed should be specific and must be accompanied by considera-
tions of efficiency in the provision of services and by further structural reforms, like the 
recent pensions reform (see Box 2.3).
... and, second, with the inertia 
observed in certain spending 
items
Increase (+)/Reduction (-) 2010 2011
Cyclically adjusted general government balance 2.8 2.9
Interest payments 0.1 0.3
Cyclically adjusted general government primary balance 2.9 3.2
BREAKDOWN OF THE CYCLICALLY ADUSTED PRIMARY BALANCE
    Total revenues 1.6 0.9
        Total taxes and social contributions 1.6 0.6
            Legislative changes 1.3 0.7
            Progressiveness 0.0 0.1
            Decoupling of the tax base from GDP -0.1 -0.1
            Residual (unexplained effects) 0.3 -0.1
        Other revenues -0.1 0.2
    Primary expenditure -1.4 -2.3
        Social bene?ts 0.5 -0.1
            Of which: retirement pensions 0.3 0.2
            Of which: unemployment bene?ts 0.1 -0.1
        Subsidies 0.0 -0.3
        Compensation of employees -0.3 -0.6
        Inputs -0.3 -0.3
        Public investment -0.7 -0.8
        Other expenditure -0.5 -0.3
    Memorandum items:
        General government balance (as a percentage of nominal GDP) 1.9 2.9
        Cyclical component (as a percentage of nominal GDP) -0.9 -0.1
FACTORS EXPLAINING CHANGES IN THE CYCLICALLY ADJUSTED GENERAL GOVERNMENT BALANCE 
IN SPAIN (a)  
TABLE 5.2 
Percentage of trend GDP 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The ?scal balance is presented in accordance with the Excessive De?cit Protocol de?nition.
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On 28 April 2011 the government presented a new Stability Programme Update (SPU) for 
the period 2011-14. This SPU confirms the budget consolidation path to 2013 approved in 
May 2010, which, if complied with, will enable the Stability Pact limits to be complied with, 
in accordance with the recommendations of the European Council. The general govern-
ment deficit would stand at 3% of GDP in 2013 and the public debt-to-GDP ratio would 
stabilise at slightly below 70% of GDP in 2012-13, up from 60.1% in 2010. The SPU also 
presents the deficit target for 2014 (2.1%), when it is planned to reduce public debt to 
68.9% of GDP. If these targets are achieved, the strategy proposed in May 2010 of bring-
ing forward to 2010 and 2011 70% of the structural adjustment for the whole of the period 
2009-13 would be validated. In addition, from the viewpoint of the quality of public fi-
nances, of the total adjustment to be made in the period 2009-13, 65% comes from 
spending reductions, and 35% from the adjustment of government consumption (21% of 
the total from the reduction of compensation of employees). However, the April 2011 SPU 
is based on a macroeconomic scenario that entails relatively high GDP growth rates and if 
these are not confirmed the achievement of the fiscal projections would be complicated. 
In this respect, the SPU includes a commitment to comply with the government deficit 
reduction targets even if the actual macroeconomic scenario is less favourable than the 
one envisaged.
The year 2010 was characterised by the gradual withdrawal of certain policies designed to 
sustain short-term demand that had been introduced during the crisis. However, the re-
sources used to finance productive investment and the working capital of SMEs and the 
self-employed, through different ICO facilities, were maintained. In addition, a new pro-
gramme of ICO financing at market prices was approved for the period 15 June 2010 to 31 
December 2011, under which direct loans were granted to the self-employed and SMEs, 
with the credit risk involved assumed by the ICO. From its launch until March 2011, around 
3,000 applications were approved under this programme, with an average amount of 
€40,000.
In addition, certain structural reforms were introduced, including notably the labour market 
reform. The aims of this reform, approved through an emergency procedure in June and 
ratified by Parliament in September, include the reduction of duality and wage rigidity, two 
of the main structural problems in the Spanish labour market. The main changes made by 
this Law are, first, improvement in the actual possibilities of wage opt-out, so that, follow-
ing the reform, this is permitted if the firm and workers agree to it, irrespective of the provi-
sions of the higher-level agreement. Second, the encouragement of permanent hiring, by 
increasing the possibilities for objective dismissal, through redefining the economic 
grounds (which now include the current or anticipated adverse situation of the firm), and 
by significantly widening the eligibility criteria for employment-promoting contracts (with 
lower firing costs). New limits are established for temporary hiring, the maximum duration 
of a contract for a specific task being limited to two years, which can be extended to three 
by agreement, and the costs of termination of temporary contracts are increased, to 12 
days per year worked in 2015. Private employment agencies are permitted to act in the 
labour intermediation process, in cooperation with the public employment service, which 
should facilitate the process of matching job offers with job seekers. Finally, the possibili-
ties for making applications for suspension of contracts or short-time working are wid-
ened, with the aim of smoothing employment adjustments.
It is still too early to assess the extent to which the aims of the Law are being achieved, 
given the short period since its approval and the difficulty in untangling its influence 
from other developments in recent months relating to the cycle. The greater possibili-
The recent updated Stability 
Programme sets an 
appropriate consolidation 
path, which must be strictly 
complied with
2.2 OTHER ECONOMIC 
POLICIES
Certain demand policies 
introduced during the crisis 
were withdrawn in 2010...
... and certain structural 
reforms were introduced, 
among which that of the 
labour market, with the aim of 
reducing duality and wage 
rigidity, was notable
The evidence on the impact of 
the reform is still limited
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ties for wage opt-outs should result in more moderate wage settlements, but this, as 
mentioned below, was not apparent in the first few months of 2011. At the end of 2010 
an increase in hiring based on employment-promoting contracts was detected, in line 
with expectations, although the total number of permanent contracts has barely in-
creased (see Table 5.3). Finally, there was a rise in applications for short-time working 
in the second half of 2010, in line with the new incentives provided by the reform, and 
there is also some evidence of an increase in the percentage of dismissals on objective 
grounds.
Following the approval of this Law certain additional measures were introduced in relation 
to the labour market. Inter alia, the use of part-time contracts for certain groups is pro-
moted and there are plans to design individualised programmes to improve the employa-
bility of the groups most affected by the crisis.
This reform was supplemented 
by subsequent developments 
which combine incentives for 
short-term hiring with changes 
to active policies
Total
permanent (a)
Permanent
employment
promoting (a)
Temporary
employment
ratio (b)
Part-time
ratio (b)
Number of 
employees
Weights
2000 8.7 — 32.2 8.0 1,282 2.1 —
2001 9.3 — 32.2 8.1 771 0.6 18.2
2002 9.0 4.7 31.8 8.3 1,268 1.8 18.1
2003 8.7 4.4 31.8 8.4 2,008 2.4 14.0
2004 8.7 3.9 32.5 9.1 525 0.9 11.6
2005 9.0 1.7 33.3 12.3 850 1.2 10.6
2006 11.8 3.9 34.0 12.1 157 0.3 8.9
2007 11.9 4.6 31.7 12.1 226 0.4 7.7
2008 11.5 3.5 29.3 12.3 2,675 1.8 10.6
2009 9.4 1.6 25.4 13.3 20,591 3.7 15.2
2010 8.5 1.9 24.9 14.0 38,136 12.7 18.3
2009 
Q1 11.1 1.8 25.4 13.2 4,843 2.6 15.3
Q2 9.6 1.7 25.2 13.5 6,948 4.8 15.4
Q3 8.3 1.5 25.9 12.8 5,640 5.2 14.8
Q4 8.6 1.5 25.1 13.9 3,160 2.8 15.1
2010 
Q1 9.6 1.6 24.4 14.0 3,304 4.2 16.3
Q2 8.7 1.5 24.9 14.2 2,517 3.7 17.1
Q3 7.5 1.7 25.6 13.4 10,096 18.0 18.7
Q4 8.4 2.7 24.8 14.2 22,219 22.8 21.6
2011 
Q1 (e) 9.4 2.0 24.8 14.8 9,930 22.4 24.1
APPLICATION FOR SHORT-TIME 
WORKING (c)
OBJECTIVE 
DISMISSAL (d)
PERMANENT AND PART-TIME HIRING (a) 
TABLE 5.3 LABOUR MARKET: SOME IMPORTANT INDICATORS 
SOURCE: Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración and INE.
a The weight of this type of hiring in total hiring. 
b Ratio to EPA employees.
c Number of workers affected by an application for short-time working and their weight in the total number of workers subject to all types of labour force adjustment 
applications. 
d Initial bene?ciaries of contributory bene?ts as a result of an objective dismissal as a percentaje of all bene?ciairies as a result of dismissals or applications for labour 
force reduction. 
e 2011 Q1 only covers January and February in the case of objective dismissals.
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As regards other reforms, notable, first, are the measures approved to make the pur-
chase and rental of housing fiscally comparable, through the elimination of the deduc-
tion for house purchase for incomes above a certain threshold and the equalising of the 
deductions for purchase and rental for other incomes from 1 January 2011. This reform 
amounts to significant progress in tax neutrality with respect to the two ways of pos-
sessing housing, which is especially necessary in the case of Spain owing, among oth-
er aspects, to the low weight of rented housing and the perverse effects of this on 
worker mobility.
In addition, the Law on default1 was amended in order to limit the power of general govern-
ment and large firms when establishing payment conditions, which during the crisis appear to 
have had a particularly adverse impact on the liquidity of SMEs and the self-employed. Also, 
the process of transposition of the Services Directive continued in 2010, with the approval of 
the Law to Reform the Retail Trade Law, which reduces the administrative burden of setting 
up retail establishments, although the regional governments have retained most of the re-
gional licences required for the opening of large retail outlets.
In February 2011 the sustainable economy Law was approved, which includes, inter 
alia, a set of measures designed to reduce the time needed to start up a business that 
has already been incorporated. Given that the most onerous part, in terms of time and 
money, of the process of creating a firm is precisely that of starting up the business, 
implementation of the measures envisaged in this Law could simplify this process 
considerably.
With regard to the regulatory environment, the sustainable economy Law establishes cer-
tain principles of good regulation. To apply these principles, the Law requires that an ex-
ante analysis be carried out of the regulatory impact of every initiative, as well as an ex-
post analysis to verify the achievement of its aims. In addition, modification of the 
organisational structure of the National Energy Commission, the Telecommunications Mar-
ket Commission and the National Postal Sector Commission is proposed, with a reduction 
in the number of board members in each case, the establishment of a non-renewable 
6-year term, a prohibition on the attendance of members of the government or senior 
management at board meetings and the acts of these regulatory bodies concluding ad-
ministrative proceedings. Together these changes may give these regulatory bodies great-
er independence. Also, among measures to reform the financial market, in line with inter-
national agreements to increase transparency and enhance corporate governance, the 
sustainable economy Law amends the Securities Market Law so that listed companies 
make available to their shareholders a remuneration report to be approved by the share-
holders in general meeting.
As regards the energy sector, measures were adopted at the end of the year to contain 
the creation of future tariff deficits and the Electricity Debt Amortisation Fund (FADE, 
by its Spanish initials) was set up during the year, with the object of providing liquidity 
to electricity utilities through securitisation of the accumulated debt deriving from the 
tariff deficit. In addition, a reduction in subsidies for renewable energy was approved.2 
Finally, in the context of the fiscal consolidation process a programme of partial priva-
tisations was announced, which would affect both the management of airports and 
lotteries.
As regards other policies, 
noteworthy were the 
elimination of the housing 
deduction for incomes above 
a certain level, the approval of 
the retail trade law...
... as well as the approval of 
the sustainable economy Law, 
which includes, among other 
measures, simplification of the 
administrative steps involved 
in starting up a business 
activity and an improvement in 
the regulatory environment
Finally, the approval of 
measures to moderate the 
increase in the tariff deficit and 
the promotion of a 
privatisation programme is 
also noteworthy
1  Law 15/2010 of 5 July 2010 on measures to combat default in commercial transactions.
2  For photovoltaic installations the premiums and the hours eligible for premiums have been reduced.
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The adjustment of national demand, which had been very intense in 2009, continued in 
2010, albeit at a more moderate pace, of -1.1% (see Table 5.4). This slowdown in the de-
cline in domestic agents’ spending was the result of opposite movements in its public and 
private components.
Private consumption, which grew by 1.2%, behaved irregularly in 2010, since certain tem-
porary factors (including notably the rise in VAT rates on 1 July) led to a shift in the timing of 
spending decisions, which tended to be concentrated in the first half of the year (see Chart 
5.3). This phenomenon particularly affected the acquisition of durables, whose timing was 
also influenced by the extension to the first half of the subsidies for new car purchases. In 
the year as a whole, car purchases fell, although the consumption of durable goods grew 
moderately.
Household disposable income declined by 4.4% in real terms, the largest fall in recent 
decades (see Chart 5.4). This decline, which contrasts with the increase of 1.6% in 2009, 
is explained by the confluence of various factors. First, the change in fiscal policy stance 
moderated the contribution of general government to household income, while the boost 
provided in 2009 by net interest income was reversed in 2010, with income deducted from 
households, since interest receipts declined to a greater extent than interest payments. In 
addition, wage income fell again, since the lower intensity of job destruction was offset by 
the greater wage moderation in the private sector and the cut in the wages of public-sector 
employees. Finally, the decline in nominal income, by -1.1%, was exacerbated by the loss 
of purchasing power deriving from the rise in inflation.
Despite the fall in real income, consumption rose modestly. In the context described of 
deteriorating income, this led to a sharp fall in the household saving rate, which stood 
at 13.1% at end-2010, down almost 5 pp from 2009, although still somewhat above its 
historical average level. This seems to reflect the desire of households to smooth their 
consumption, by lowering their saving rate from the high levels of 2008 and 2009. This 
cushioning role for savings has been underpinned by a certain stabilisation in con-
sumer confidence, partly influenced by the moderation in the rate of deterioration of the 
labour market, although uncertainty remained high and confidence was sensitive to 
various events, such as the strains in the sovereign debt market and, in 2011, the rise 
in oil prices and interest rates. In this respect, against a background of continued de-
clines in real income, the rise in consumption in 2011 will be marginal. This, at least in 
the short term, will not prevent a further fall in the saving rate, until there is some sign 
of a recovery in income.
Last year residential investment remained very weak, as a consequence of the gradual 
stabilisation of housing starts at very low levels, while a larger number of houses continued 
to be completed (see Chart 5.5). This led to a further decline in the volume of construction 
in progress, the growth rate of which stood at around -17%. The execution of new residen-
tial projects continued to be curbed in 2010 by the slackness of demand and by the pres-
ence of a significant volume of unsold housing, which led housing starts to stand at around 
125,000, approximately one-sixth of their level just three years earlier. However, the con-
vergence in recent quarters between starts and completions points towards stabilisation 
of the rate of housing construction and, therefore, of residential investment towards the 
end of this year.
3 Demand
3.1 NATIONAL DEMAND
National demand continued to 
adjust in 2010, but at a more 
moderate pace compared with 
2009
The path of private 
consumption over the year 
was bumpy, owing to the 
bringing forward of spending 
caused by the VAT increase 
in July
Household income fell...
... which led households to 
smooth their consumption 
using their savings
Residential investment 
continued to decline owing 
to the low level of 
commencement of new 
projects and the stock 
of unsold housing is still 
very high
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In 2010 the cycle of successive contractions in house purchases that started in 2007 came 
to an end, with positive year-on-year growth of around 6% and 490,000 houses sold. How-
ever, this amount represents little more than 50% of the peak level, recorded in 2006. In 
addition, the timid growth last year in transactions partly reflects the bringing forward of 
purchase decisions caused by temporary fiscal factors, such as the increase in indirect 
taxes in July 2010 and the partial elimination in January 2011 of tax deductions for the pur-
chase of principal residences. Simultaneously, other more permanent factors appear to 
have had mixed effects. On one hand, purchase decisions were driven by an improvement 
in accessibility indicators associated with the falls in the prices of residential assets and 
with the low interest rates that predominated during the year on average. On the other 
hand, the weakness of household income and the tightening of mortgage credit standards 
appear to have had a negative effect on the volume of transactions. Housing starts are cur-
rently estimated to be below the demand for new housing, so that the stock of unsold hous-
ing will gradually be absorbed, although residential investment can be expected to remain 
markedly slack for some years, which should also affect prices. In this respect, Box 5.1 
makes an international comparison of the adjustment of housing prices during the crisis.
In 2010 certain temporary 
factors helped to sustain the 
demand for housing
% of GDP (a) RATE OF CHANGE (b)
2000 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
NATIONAL DEMAND 103.1 102.2 5.1 5.2 4.1 -0.6 -6.0 -1.1
HOUSEHOLDS AND NPISHs
    Final consumption expenditure 59.7 58.4 4.2 3.8 3.7 -0.6 -4.2 1.2
        Durable consumption 6.3 3.7 5.5 3.8 3.3 -14.6 -10.9 3.8
        Non-durable consumption 53.4 54.7 4.1 3.8 3.7 0.7 -3.7 1.1
    Housing 6.1 4.7 6.1 6.2 2.5 -10.7 -24.5 -16.8
CORPORATIONS
    Private productive investment (c) 16.6 14.1 7.4 7.7 3.8 -2.4 -18.2 -0.6
        Construction 4.8 5.4 5.7 4.8 -0.6 1.2 -7.7 1.6
        Capital goods 7.3 4.8 9.1 10.5 10.2 -4.0 -29.2 3.7
        Other (d) 4.4 3.9 7.1 7.5 0.8 -4.1 -16.2 -8.2
GENERAL GOVERNMENT
    Final consumption expenditure 17.2 20.9 5.5 4.6 5.5 5.8 3.2 -0.7
    Gross ?xed capital formation 3.2 3.7 7.8 7.5 13.1 -1.5 11.2 -17.3
        Construction 2.3 2.7 7.3 8.1 13.7 -4.4 14.6 -21.0
        Capital goods 0.8 1.0 9.3 6.0 11.3 7.5 1.8 -6.2
MEMORANDUM ITEMS:
    Gross ?xed capital formation 25.8 22.6 7.0 7.2 4.5 -4.8 -16.0 -7.6
        Capital goods 8.1 5.9 9.2 9.9 10.4 -2.5 -24.8 1.8
            Machinery 5.7 4.3 6.9 10.3 11.7 0.4 -23.1 2.1
            Transport 2.4 1.6 14.0 9.1 7.6 -8.9 -28.9 0.9
        Construction 13.3 12.8 6.1 6.0 3.2 -5.9 -11.9 -11.1
            Housing 6.1 4.7 6.1 6.2 2.5 -10.7 -24.5 -16.8
            Other construction 7.2 8.1 6.2 5.8 4.0 -0.8 -0.1 -7.2
        Other (d) 4.4 3.9 7.1 7.5 0.8 -4.1 -16.2 -8.2
CONSUMPTION AND GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION BY INSTITUTIONAL SECTOR TABLE 5.4 
SOURCE: INE and Banco de España. 
a National Accounts, base 2000, current prices. 
b National Accounts, base 2000, rates of change of volume indices. 
c Includes investment by sole propietors.  
d This investment includes real estate, legal, accounting, consultancy and software services, among others. 
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Private non-residential investment continued on the path of mild recovery that began in 
late 2009, reaching positive year-on-year growth rates in the second half of 2010, although 
in the year as a whole it posted a modest decline, of 0.6%. This gradual improvement oc-
curred thanks to the favourable behaviour of external demand and the improvement in 
industrial confidence. Also, the annual average cost of bank financing fell, while other 
credit conditions, although they remained tight, did not deteriorate with respect to 2009. 
Finally, the financial position of firms improved in 2010, with a slight correction of the debt 
ratio and an increase in profitability, which eased the financial pressure on investment (see 
Chart 6.6). In 2011, the gradual improvement in domestic demand and a continuation of 
the favourable behaviour of exports are expected to boost business investment, despite 
the foreseeable increase in the cost of financing.
Behaviour varied considerably across products. In particular, capital goods expanded 
moderately, partly because, following the sharp decline in 2009, their replacement de-
mand increased. The overall adjustment of investment in capital goods during the crisis 
has been more drastic than in the euro area, and the initial phase of the cyclical upswing 
is proving more muted than in similar episodes in the past (see Chart 5.5).
Business investment 
continued the mild recovery 
that began in late 2009, driven 
by exports
Spending on capital goods 
posted a positive growth rate 
in 2010, although, in 
comparison with similar past 
episodes and with the euro 
area, its recovery has been 
moderate
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BOX 5.1THE HOUSE PRICE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
Since 2007 a group of advanced countries, Spain among them, 
have seen their real estate markets undergo a severe adjustment. 
Previously, during the upturn, many of these economies had wit-
nessed high growth in house prices and notably buoyant resi-
dential investment, attaining levels that proved hardly sustaina-
ble either from the standpoint of productive and financial re-
sources geared to real estate activity or from that of asset 
valuation. From 1997 to 2007, real average house prices rose by 
115% in Spain, while they increased by almost 160% in Ireland, 
140% in the United Kingdom and around 80% in the United 
States. In France the increase was 50%, above the euro area 
average, which stood at 40% (see panel 1). In the current phase 
of the adjustment the excesses built up previously are being cor-
rected, with cross-country differences in the scale and pattern of 
adjustment (of prices and amounts).
In Spain’s case the upturn in the housing cycle was linked to 
strong demand-side pressures which, though underpinned in 
part by the course of certain fundamentals and met by a highly 
dynamic response in terms of the production of housing units, 
gave rise to strong pressure on the value of residential assets. 
Demographic factors (population and household size) deter-
mined high growth in the demand for housing, which was also 
boosted by the cut in real interest rates associated with the 
change in regime that Monetary Union membership entailed. As 
housing is a long-lasting asset, the demand for it and its price are 
highly sensitive to permanent declines in interest rates, espe-
cially when, moreover, conditions conducive to an increase in 
credit and in indebtedness prevail, as occurred in Spain. While 
the nature of some of these factors was common to other coun-
tries, their impact was heterogeneous and of differing intensity. 
Thus, for instance, whereas household debt in Spain rose to 
around 130% of GDI in 2007, this ratio was even higher in Ire-
land, at 200%. In other economies, such as France and, above 
all, the United States and the United Kingdom, the changes in 
these demand variables were less significant.
The rising course of house prices prompted a strong boost to 
activity in a large number of economies. In early 2007, at the 
height of the cycle, the production of new houses peaked in 
many markets. The strong growth in the volume of housing 
starts and, consequently, in construction was reflected in Na-
tional Accounts figures, whereby the weight of investment in 
housing in GDP moved on a rising trajectory in these areas, 
reaching particularly high levels in Ireland and Spain (14% and 
9%, respectively; see panel 2). Occasionally, the pressure of de-
mand on real assets was not confined to housing but also fed 
through to non-residential real estate assets (shopping centres, 
offices, etc.). That drove the exuberance of investment in this 
market segment, involving the disproportionate development of 
new projects, and prompted price trajectories in these assets 
which, ultimately, proved unsustainable. In these circumstanc-
es, the situation of the Irish real estate market was particularly 
paradigmatic.
Admittedly, the macroeconomic fundamentals in place during the 
expansionary phase could warrant a rising path in house prices 
and residential investment; but there is also consensus that the 
increases observed might contain a somewhat significant com-
ponent of overreaction. Thus, in relation to prices, and according 
to the analysis conducted by the International Monetary Fund, 
the residential market in Spain at end-2007 evidenced a level of 
prices in real terms that exceeded that warranted by its determi-
nants by 17%. That said, the figure estimated for other econo-
mies was higher (in Ireland, the United Kingdom and France, the 
overvaluation amounted to 32%, 28% and 22%, respectively) 
(see panel 3).
Although the excessive size of housing markets in these coun-
tries was patent in early 2007, the outbreak of the international 
financial crisis heightened the factors of fragility, giving rise to 
very sharp adjustment trajectories. In Ireland’s case, the fact that 
the rises in both house prices and residential investment during 
the boom was sharper suggested that the correction in this 
country might be greater than that in other economies. Indeed, 
on National Accounts data, the cumulative decline in residential 
investment from its peak to date would be close to 70% in Ire-
land, while the fall in other markets was less intense (57% in the 
United States and 43% in Spain, while in the United Kingdom the 
decline was approximately 20%).
The adjustment of house prices has also been sharper in Ireland, 
with a cumulative decline of 35% in real terms, similar to that 
observed for the United States. However, it should be stressed 
that, in the case of the US market, the adjustment had run its 
course in 2009 and that prices have held relatively stable since 
then. Conversely, the declining course of prices in Ireland has run 
to the present. In the United Kingdom, the real adjustment of 
house prices has been less pronounced, leading to a total fall of 
close to 17%. For 2011 and 2012, further declines in prices are 
forecast in Ireland and, more modestly so, in the United Kingdom.
In Spain’s case house prices, according to information from the 
Ministry of Development, have fallen in real terms by 20% from 
2007 to 2011 Q1 (and by 15% in nominal terms), slightly more 
sharply than in the United Kingdom. As earlier mentioned, the 
different trend in fundamentals would warrant a different correc-
tion in each case. But certain features of the Spanish mortgage 
market, where debtors respond with all their assets to debts in-
curred, compared with other countries, such as the United 
States, where liability is limited in some cases to the house that 
has been mortgaged, introduce an element which tends to limit 
the adjustment of prices in Spain. This characteristic can be 
seen, moreover, in Spain’s relatively small non-performing mort-
gage loan ratio compared with other countries.
It should also be underscored that the average adjustment of house 
prices in Spain masks significant differences in terms of the particu-
lar characteristics of each dwelling (geographical or inner-city loca-
BOX 5.1THE HOUSE PRICE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON (cont’d)
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SOURCES: INE, Ministerio de Fomento, AMECO, Datastream, IMF and Banco de España.
a The 2011 and 2012 forecasts are from the EBA central scenario (March 2011).
b World Economic Outlook (October 2007 and April 2008). For the United States the calculation is for 2006.
c Annual theoretical effort excluding deductions.
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BOX 5.1THE HOUSE PRICE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON (cont’d)
tion, age, first or second home, etc.). Thus, the area encompassing 
the Mediterranean provinces and those close to the Madrid region 
have posted an average fall in prices that is 5 pp more marked than 
the national aggregate, whereas in other areas, by contrast, the de-
cline has been very small and even non-existent (see panel 6). It 
should likewise be highlighted that the real cumulative adjustment in 
house prices in Spain in the current cycle is similar, to date, to that 
which took place during the correction phase in the early 1990s. 
That said, moderate cuts might be expected to continue over the 
near horizon as a result of the sizeable overhang of houses for sale 
and of the foreseeable increase in the cost of mortgage financing, 
which will exert downward pressure on the value of the assets to 
ease its impact on the affordability indicators (see panel 5). As a 
result, the cumulative correction in house prices could amount to 
25% in real terms in 2012, drawing close to the path observed in the 
real estate crisis in the 1970s (see panel 4).
In a framework in which access to external financing (through borrowing or securities issu-
ance) remained highly restricted, the generation of internal funds enabled private produc-
tive investment to be sustained, in addition to some deleveraging. In 2010 business saving 
continued to grow, underpinned by the recovery in the gross operating surplus and the 
reduction in the interest burden. This increase in saving, along with the moderate fall in 
investment, enabled the financial position of firms to improve, with overall net lending of 
0.4% of GDP in 2010.
Finally, as mentioned, general government demand was contractionary. The stepping 
up in the spring of the budget consolidation process meant that government consump-
tion and public investment, which had previously helped to sustain domestic demand, 
ceased to do so in 2010. Moreover, given the pending fiscal adjustment, these spending 
components can be expected to continue to make a negative contribution over the next 
few years.
Net external demand again made a notable positive contribution to GDP growth in 2010 (1 
pp), although it was smaller than in 2009. The notable momentum of exports of goods and 
services (which grew by more than 10% in real terms) should be highlighted, while imports of 
goods and services also recovered, although to a lesser extent, recording modest growth 
(5.4% in real terms) given the weak rise in final demand. In the months that have already 
elapsed in 2011, trade flows have exhibited marked strength, especially in the case of exports, 
so that net external demand is expected to contribute positively to output again.
Following the collapse of world trade in 2009, goods exports were the Spanish economy’s 
main engine of growth in 2010, with an annual increase of 13.6%, which exceeded the 
growth in Spain’s export markets. The stimulus from the upswing in world trade and com-
petitiveness gains (largely due to wage containment) more than offset the negative effect of 
the progressive disappearance of the exceptional measures implemented in some countries 
last year, like the vehicle replacement support programmes that had stimulated sales abroad 
in 2009. Also, the weakness of national demand encouraged Spanish firms to sell their 
products abroad.
According to the information available at firm level, the drastic decline in goods exports in 
2009 was attributable, above all, to a reduction in the average amount exported by each 
firm and, to a much lesser extent, to the withdrawal of firms from export markets. This 
The increase in saving and the 
fall in business investment 
allowed the corporate sector 
to record net lending
General government’s 
contribution to demand was 
strongly contractionary
3.2 EXTERNAL DEMAND
In 2010 net external demand 
again made a positive 
contribution to GDP growth, 
thanks to more buoyant 
exports
Goods exports, favoured by 
the expansion of world trade 
and accumulated 
competitiveness 
improvements, drove the 
recovery of the Spanish 
economy
... with similar buoyancy 
across most geographical 
areas and products
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suggests that firms withstood the world trade crisis well, facilitating the subsequent recov-
ery in their sales. Although the presence of Spanish firms in the fastest-growing markets 
(in particular, in emerging economies) is still low, sales to these economies recorded very 
high growth rates in 2010 as a whole, which is contributing to the necessary geographical 
diversification of Spanish exports (see Chart 5.6). Finally, by type of product, the accelera-
tion in exports was across-the-board, although it was most notable in the chemicals and 
basic metals industries and transport equipment, while sales of cars, although growing by 
somewhat less, made a significant contribution to the recovery of exports in 2010, given 
their large weight in total exports.
In 2010 as a whole, Spain’s share of world exports, in real terms, improved slightly, having 
remained relatively stable in the previous two years, when the gain in share in the devel-
oped countries, in particular in the euro area, was offset by the loss in the emerging areas 
(see Chart 5.7). In the euro area, Germany also increased its market share, while those of 
France and, in particular, Italy declined. In the first few months of 2011 exports have con-
tinued to drive growth, displaying greater buoyancy than world markets, which suggests 
that Spain’s market share continues to expand.
The share of goods exports in 
world markets increased 
slightly
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Services exports also returned to a positive growth path in 2010 (4.2%), especially non-
tourism services (5.5%), in step with the growth in activity and, in particular, in goods trade 
and tourist flows, which boosted transport services. Tourism receipts benefited from the 
emergence from the economic crisis of some of the main countries that provide tourists for 
Spain and the weakness of the euro against the dollar and sterling. Along with an aggres-
sive price cutting policy, this helped to mitigate growing competition from the eastern 
Mediterranean countries. However, the negative impact of certain exceptional events, 
such as the temporary closure of European airspace due to a volcanic eruption in Iceland, 
adverse meteorological conditions and the air traffic controllers strike in Spain, meant that 
tourism receipts continued to post moderate growth rates in 2010 (2.5%). In 2011, the 
growth rate of services exports is expected to accelerate, as the economic position of 
Spain’s main customers continues to strengthen and tourists have been diverted towards 
Spain as a result of the geopolitical instability in certain Arab countries.
The recovery of goods imports was much more moderate than that of goods exports (with 
an annual increase of 6.2%), given the weakness of national demand and the rise in the 
prices of imported products, especially commodities. That said, import penetration in fi-
nal demand increased again in 2010. The pattern of imports over the year was largely 
determined by the bringing forward of consumption decisions to the second quarter from 
Services exports also 
recorded positive growth, 
although it was more 
moderate than in the case 
of goods
The rate of recovery of imports 
was influenced by two 
opposing factors: the 
weakness of domestic demand 
and the buoyancy of exports
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the third quarter (which indicates the dependence of the Spanish economy on goods for 
which there is no domestically produced equivalent). As at year-end, import growth was 
strongly linked to the buoyancy of exports, especially in those sectors that are highly 
dependent on imported inputs. In 2011 the growth of imports will again be constrained by 
the relatively moderate recovery in domestic demand, in particular private consumption, 
and by the increase in their prices, although the strength of exports may have some 
positive effect on imports.
The decline in activity in the market economy as a whole moderated by more than 4 pp in 
terms of gross value added (GVA), to -0.4%, which exceeded the decline in GDP as a whole 
by more than 3 pp. Both the industrial and the services sectors posted positive, albeit mod-
est, rates of change, following the notable falls in 2009, while GVA in construction con-
tracted at a high rate. For its part, the GVA of non-market services decelerated notably 
during the year, growing at an annual average rate of 0.8%, as against 2.1% in 2009.
Following the marked cumulative adjustment during the preceding two years, GVA in 
the industrial and energy sectors returned to positive growth rates in 2010 (1.3%), driv-
en by external demand (see Chart 5.8). All the large industrial sectors grew, except 
those producing capital goods, which continued to contract, but at a notably lower rate. 
The highest growth was in the intermediate goods (in particular, the chemicals industry, 
4 Activity
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in line with the buoyancy of this sector’s exports) and, to a lesser extent, non-food con-
sumer goods sectors.
Despite the modest recovery last year and at the beginning of 2011, the current level of 
industrial output is still approximately 20% lower than in 2007, which is a sharper contrac-
tion than in the main euro area countries. These developments are partly attributable to the 
spill-over effects of the decline in construction on certain industrial sectors. More posi-
tively, those sectors with a higher technological content suffered a smaller adjustment 
during the crisis and have performed more favourably during the early stages of the recov-
ery, which is probably related to their higher export orientation. However, their low weight 
in the industrial sector as a whole (around 7.5%) limits their contribution to the expansion 
of the sector, which will depend in future upon the behaviour of the medium and low-
technology, labour-intensive sectors, which are the largest.
GVA in market services increased by 0.4% in 2010, following the significant decrease of 
around 2% recorded the previous year. In comparison with industry, the sector’s contrac-
tion during the recession was much less intense. Moreover, production in market services 
industries has already generally recovered to around its pre-crisis levels. Activity in the 
wholesale and retail trade, which is the largest one, fluctuated during 2010 as a result of 
the introduction of VAT in July, although it generally remained weak, in line with consump-
tion. Other sectors, such as hotels and restaurants and transport and storage services, 
benefited from the buoyancy of goods exports and tourism, which partly offset the greater 
slackness of domestic activity.
GVA in construction continued the intense adjustment process that had commenced 
three years earlier, with a fall of more than 6% in 2010. As already seen when demand was 
analysed, this was attributable to continuation of the intense adjustment of residential 
investment and the sharp reduction in public investment, within the framework of fiscal 
consolidation.
Employment fell in 2010 at an average rate of 2.3% (4% in the market economy). As a re-
sult the total destruction of jobs since 2007 Q3 exceeds two million, which shows the se-
verity of the impact of the economic crisis on employment. However, the decline in em-
ployment was more than 4 pp less than in 2009 (see Chart 5.9). Going forward, as in the 
case of activity, the recovery in employment is expected to be slow.
Productivity in 2010 grew by 2.3%, a more moderate rate than in 2009, confirming once 
again the countercyclical nature of this variable in the Spanish economy. This behaviour is 
the result of the combination of a high degree of wage rigidity and strong segmentation of 
the labour market, which means that the adjustment to shocks takes place mainly through 
the level of employment, in particular, temporary employment. Since temporary workers 
on average have lower levels of training and experience than other workers, a reduction in 
their numbers leads to an increase in average productivity. In fact, temporary employment 
fell by 4% in 2010, while permanent employment declined by 1.5%. The same pattern of 
behaviour was seen right across the market economy, with the rise in productivity in indus-
try standing out.
Construction continued to be the sector in which most employment was destroyed in 
2010, with an average change of -12.5%, although the decline in employment in industry 
was also considerable (-5.8%). For its part, employment in non-market services grew by 
2.2%, a similar rate to 2009, although it decelerated as the year elapsed. According to 
Market services also showed 
some improvement, based 
mainly on domestic demand
The rate of decline in 
construction accelerated 
slightly, with adjustment in the 
residential component coming 
on top of the strong 
contraction in public works
5 The labour market
The destruction of 
employment continued in 
2010, but at a slower pace
Productivity, as usual, 
behaved countercyclically
In construction, employment 
continued to be destroyed at 
a marked rate...
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 139 ANNUAL REPORT, 2010 5. THE SPANISH ECONOMY
data from the Register of Personnel in General Government Service, growth was more 
moderate, at around 0.8% (on data to July 2010), as against 2.2% in 2009, as a result of 
the progressive application of the public sector employment reduction plan.
Although destruction of employment occurred in almost all sectors of the market econo-
my, the rate of deterioration moderated with respect to 2009. It can be seen from the 
quarterly profile for 2010 that the destruction of employment practically stopped in market 
services, while in agriculture there was timid job creation.
In contrast with previous crises the participation rate continued to display some strength, 
despite the severe deterioration in the labour market, with a moderate increase (of 0.1 pp, 
to 60%). This enabled the labour force growth rate to remain in positive territory (0.2%), 
despite being lower than in 2009 (0.8%), on account of the slowdown in the increase in the 
immigrant population that has been recorded since soon after the start of the crisis. Male 
participation and that of younger persons (aged 16-24) did respond negatively to the cycli-
... while in other sectors the 
fall in employment was halted
Participation decisions barely 
responded to the adverse 
labour market conditions
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cal situation. In the case of the latter there was an increase in their participation in training 
activities. The reduction in the participation of these groups was not sufficient, however, to 
offset the tendency towards greater female participation in the labour market.
The growth of unemployment moderated, but remained strong, standing at 11.6% in 2010, 
and the rate of unemployment rose to 20.1%, up more than 2 pp from 2009. This increase 
was broad-based, but more marked among the youngest, those with low skill levels and 
foreigners. Long-term unemployment rose sharply and its relative incidence (42.5%) stood 
at high levels (52.6% among 45-64 year olds), a worrying situation given the greater diffi-
culty that the long-term unemployed have returning to the labour market.
The signing in February 2010 of the 2010-2012 Employment and Collective Bargaining 
Agreement by the social partners, along with the significant cut in the wages of public-
sector employees and the moderate inflation rates deriving from the unemployment gap, 
created a more favourable setting for wage moderation in 2010. Compensation per em-
ployee in the market economy grew by 1.4%, down 2.3 pp from 2009, in line with the 
growth in wage rates agreed in collective bargaining (1.3%, as against 2.3% in 2009). The 
slowdown in non-market services was even sharper, with an average fall of 1.8% in 2010, 
owing to the general government wage cut.
However, the sharp rise in inflation in the final stages of 2010 and the first few months of 
2011 caused the wage increases in the agreements registered at the beginning of this year 
to be higher than those in 2010 (around 3%). There is therefore a risk that the high inflation 
in late 2010 and early 2011 will feed through into excessive wages, thereby hampering the 
recovery in competitiveness and employment.
The gradual increase in the rate of growth of the CPI, which had commenced in summer 
2009, continued last year (see Chart 5.10). Specifically, the average annual inflation rate in 
2010 was 1.8%, while in December the annual rate was 3%, 2.2 pp higher than in the 
same month a year earlier. This tendency for inflation to rise continued at the beginning of 
2011, until April, when it peaked at 3.8% and began to fall. The developments described 
reflect, above all, the concurrence of various predominantly temporary factors whose im-
pact on the rate of change of the CPI should, in principle, disappear during 2011. These 
factors include the rise in commodities prices (especially the oil price) on international 
markets, certain tax rises (within the fiscal consolidation framework) and the increase in 
certain regulated prices.
For this reason, to explain inflation developments in 2010 and early 2011 it is useful to 
break down the annual growth rate of the CPI, in order to quantify the approximate contri-
butions of each of these factors. The difference between the overall indicator and the total 
contribution of these factors gives a more accurate indication of underlying inflationary 
pressures. Specifically, of the 2.2 pp by which inflation increased between December 2009 
and December 2010, the temporary factors would together explain 1.4 pp, the residual 
part, unrelated to these factors, being 0.8 pp.
The behaviour of the prices of energy goods explains 0.7 pp of the increase in inflation last 
year. The notable acceleration in these prices in 2010 and early 2011 reflected, above all, 
an external shock, namely a significant rise in the US-dollar oil price, against a background 
of strong demand expansion in the emerging countries, geopolitical tensions in certain 
producing countries and a lack of exploration. However, other factors also contributed to 
the increase in energy prices. First, not only did the pre-tax prices of heating and vehicle 
Unemployment grew rapidly, 
but at a slower rate than in 
2009
Wages moderated in 2010...
... although there are signs of a 
rise in 2011
6 Prices and costs
Inflation is tending to rise, 
owing to factors that are, in 
principle, temporary... 
... such as the trend in energy 
prices...
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fuels swiftly reflect, as usual, the rise in the cost of oil, but the price increases were larger 
in Spain than in the euro area as a whole, which may be a consequence of insufficient 
competition in the sector, as well as the rigidity of energy demand in Spain. Second, the 
regulated prices of natural gas, butane gas and electricity were increased in order to bring 
them into line with cost.
Standing out among the fiscal consolidation measures with direct effects on prices is the 
July 2010 increase in VAT rates. Final prices would have increased by 1.1 pp if the tax 
change had been fully passed through. However, the various estimates available indicate 
that the actual pass-through was around 50%, so that the tax increase would explain 0.6 
pp of the change in the overall CPI. This pass-through is smaller than that estimated for 
the increases in VAT rates in 1992 and 1995, which may be because the weakness of 
household consumption at the current stage in the cycle caused part of the tax rise to be 
absorbed in producers’ and retailers’ margins. The increase in taxes on tobacco also had 
a discernible effect on the CPI.
On average last year, the CPI excluding unprocessed food and energy increased by 0.6%, 
a record low rate. This was consistent with the slackness of demand, which led, in par-
ticular, to a marked slowdown in services prices. This containment of underlying inflation 
meant that, despite the larger increase in indirect taxes in Spain, the inflation differential 
... and indirect taxes
The CPI excluding 
unprocessed food and energy 
reached a record low...
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with respect to the euro area, in terms of the CPI excluding unprocessed food and energy, 
was negative (-0.3%) for the second consecutive year.
The reduction of unit labour costs intensified relative to 2009, as a consequence of the 
greater containment of compensation per employee (which was more pronounced in the 
economy as a whole than in the market economy), since apparent labour productivity 
growth was lower than in 2009, reflecting the moderation of the job destruction process. 
At the same time, profit margins (approximated by the share of the operating surplus in 
value added) increased with respect to previous years, especially in the case of industry.
The rate of growth of private demand deflators increased in 2010, reflecting the strong ac-
celeration (by almost 17 pp) in import prices. For its part, the government consumption 
deflator fell in 2010 as a consequence of the public sector pay cuts. The acceleration of 
the domestic component of inflation, approximated by the GDP deflator, was more mod-
est. It increased by 1% in 2010, as against 0.6% in 2009.
For the second consecutive year there were improvements in the price and cost competitive-
ness indicators vis-à-vis the developed countries, so that part of the loss accumulated in 
previous years was recovered. The gains, which in the case of competition with non-euro area 
countries were favoured by exchange rate developments, were particularly intense in terms 
of unit labour costs. This improvement in competitiveness contributed, as already indicated, 
to the slight rise in the market share of Spanish exports, in real terms, on the world market.
In principle, the impact on the annual inflation rate of the factors that have been temporar-
ily driving it will tend to disappear gradually in the second half of 2011, which should en-
able consumer price inflation to stand at around 2% at the end of 2011 and at 1.5% in 
2012 as a whole. However, these projections are subject to a high degree of uncertainty, 
since the oil price is too. In addition, the indirect effects of past oil price rises on the prices 
of other goods and the emergence of so-called second-round effects (i.e. the inflationary 
effects that arise when, in response to an external shock, agents attempt to maintain their 
margins and wages in real terms) represent channels that may put further pressure on 
domestic prices. An inappropriate reaction by the various agents to the inflation shocks 
recorded during 2010 would lead to persistently higher inflation rates, competitiveness 
losses and reductions in employment and activity.
The Spanish economy’s net borrowing continued to decline in 2010, although less sharply 
than in 2009. On national accounts data, Spain’s net borrowing reached 3.9% of GDP, 1.2 
pp less than in 2009 (see Chart 5.11). This improvement mainly reflected the decline in the 
income deficit (by 0.9 pp of GDP) and in the non-energy trade balance (by 0.6 pp), with a 
slight increase in the services surplus. Also, the capital transactions surplus widened, by 
0.3 pp of GDP. These developments offset the increase in the energy deficit.
The decline in the income deficit basically reflects the notable increase, to an all-time 
high, in the direct investment dividends received by Spanish multinationals and the 
low average level of interest rates in 2010. In the latter case, the correction of the 
income deficit moderated during the second half, in line with the rise in the cost of 
financing.
... reflecting the sharp fall in 
unit labour costs
Other price indicators did not 
moderate in 2010, basically 
owing to the imported 
component
Price and cost 
competitiveness gains were 
recorded
Inflation can be expected to 
moderate significantly in the 
second half of 2011 and in 
2012
7  The nation’s net 
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The nation’s net borrowing 
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owing to the improvement in 
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and the income balance
The lower net income 
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by the appreciable increase in 
the dividends received by 
Spanish multinationals
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The notable rise in oil prices in 2011, the magnitude and duration of which is subject to 
great uncertainty, and the upward trend in interest rates limit the margin for correction of 
the external deficit. Given the considerable dependence of the Spanish economy on 
imported goods, especially energy, and the interest burden entailed by the debt as-
sumed in the past vis-à-vis the rest of the world, it is important to review through which 
channels additional and permanent corrections in the external deficit might be achieved 
(see Box 5.2).
The decline in the net borrowing of the Spanish economy in 2010 is explained by the fall in 
national investment (by 1.5 pp of GDP to 22.5%), which widely exceeded that in the gross 
national savings ratio (of 0.4 pp of GDP to 18.5%) (see Chart 5.12). It should be noted that 
the ratio of investment to GDP in Spain remains above that of the main European coun-
tries, despite the 8 pp decline in this ratio since 2007. In 2010 private-sector net lending 
The rise in the oil price and the 
increase in income payments 
abroad are not conducive to 
more significant declines in 
the external deficit in future
The lower public-sector net 
borrowing more than offset the 
reduction in the net lending of 
the non-financial private 
sector
BOX 5.2CHANNELS FOR CORRECTING THE SPANISH EXTERNAL DEFICIT
In 2010 the Spanish economy continued reducing its external 
deficit. On National Accounts data, net borrowing stood at 3.9% 
of GDP that year, 1.2 pp less than in 2009 and almost 6 pp down 
on the 2007 peak (see panel 1). This adjustment needs to con-
tinue, especially since Spain has built up a significant negative 
output gap, with a substantial decline in investment, which should 
lessen the resort to foreign saving. Further, in 2010 the primary 
external balance was still in deficit (2.2% of GDP), suggesting 
that, in the absence of vigorous growth in activity, the Spanish 
economy’s international investment position (IIP) will remain 
strongly negative. 
Some of the factors that have hindered the correction of the 
external deficit in 2010 Q2 point to the presence of certain 
weaknesses in the Spanish economy, which need to be ad-
dressed to achieve further and persistent reductions in the def-
icit. In 2010, net borrowing was affected by the higher pay-
ments to the rest of the world connected with the increase in 
the energy bill. The rise in oil prices1 and the Spanish econo-
my’s high dependence on imported energy inputs account for 
the significant deterioration in the energy balance that year, to 
3.3% of GDP (0.8 pp more than in 2009). Also, the rapid re-
sponse of other imports to the modest pick-up in final demand 
in 2010 suggests that the traditional high income elasticity of 
Spanish imports has not changed significantly during the down-
turn, although this aspect should be analysed with caution.2 
The buoyancy of exports and the slight increase in private con-
sumption in 2010 – demand components with a greater import 
content than investment in construction – largely explain the 
recovery in purchases abroad that year (31% and 38% of the 
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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Goods and services balance -6.7 -5.8 -2.2 -2.2 -1.6 -1.3
    Energy balance -3.2 -4.1 -2.5 -3.3 -4.2 -4.2
    Non-energy goods and services balance -3.5 -1.7 0.4 1.1 2.6 2.9
Income -2.6 -3.0 -2.6 -1.7 -2.0 -2.3
Other -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Net borrowing -9.6 -9.2 -5.1 -3.9 -3.7 -3.7
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Primary external balance -7.0 -6.2 -2.5 -2.2 -1.7 -1.4
1  THE NATION'S NET BORROWING 
SOURCES: Departamento de Aduanas, INE and Banco de España. 
% of GDP 
SOURCES: International Energy Agency, Eurostat, INE and Banco de España.
a Banco de España calculations based on the Input-Output framework of the Spanish National Accounts.
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1  The price of Brent crude rose by 35% on average in 2010, after declining 
by 33% in 2009.
2  Estimates of the income elasticity of Spanish goods imports for the pe-
riod 1995-2010, based on parameters that change over time, point in 
this direction.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 145 ANNUAL REPORT, 2010 5. THE SPANISH ECONOMY
total, respectively)3 (see panel 1). All told, thanks to the strength 
of exports, boosted by the recovery in global trade and the 
gains in competitiveness made over the past two years, the 
trade surplus in non-energy goods and services increased in 
2010 to 1.1% of GDP.
The forecasts for 2011 and 2012 indicate that the external defi-
cit will narrow marginally, despite the fact that goods and ser-
vices exports are expected to continue to perform well. The 
main obstacles to more rapid adjustment are, firstly, dearer oil 
(strongly affected by the growing geopolitical instability in the 
Arab world) and, secondly, the increase in the income deficit, 
owing to the rise in interest rates in the presence of a large 
negative IIP. Here it is worth reviewing the different channels 
through which the Spanish economy might correct its external 
deficit more quickly. Three possible channels for this improve-
ment are gains in price-competitiveness, greater openness to 
foreign markets and a reduction in import dependence, in par-
ticular energy dependence.
Spanish monetary union membership makes it impossible to resort 
to competitive devaluations to make Spanish products cheaper on 
foreign markets, and make imports dearer. Accordingly, gains in 
price-competitiveness must be generated through productivity 
gains and price and wage moderation, which would be more read-
ily attainable if measures were introduced to improve the workings 
of the markets for goods, services and productive factors. That 
would further allow an increase in those Spanish companies able to 
penetrate new markets, boosting the beneficial effects of gains in 
competitiveness on exports. Against this background, the Quar-
terly Macroeconometric Model of the Banco de España (MTBE)4 
has been enlisted to simulate the effect on the external deficit of a 
1 pp reduction in relative export prices in both 2011 and 2012.5 As 
can be seen in panel 2, this measure would allow the external defi-
cit to be reduced by 0.5 pp of GDP in 2012.
Export performance depends not only on how competitive ex-
ports are, but also on the intensity of the demand for them. The 
diversification of Spanish exports towards products with higher 
value-added and towards more dynamic markets would have a 
positive impact on their performance. In fact, were Spanish firms 
to progressively increase their sales to emerging countries so 
that Spanish export markets grew at a similar rate to world mar-
kets in 2011 and 2012 (i.e. by 7.5%, instead of the 6% project-
ed), then according to the MTBE there would be an improvement 
in the nominal trade balance from the first year, which would 
reach 0.6 pp of GDP in 2012. To encourage the diversification of 
exports towards countries with dynamic demand, firms’ access 
to culturally and geographically distant markets needs to be fa-
cilitated, and their establishment in such markets needs to be 
strengthened.
Finally, limiting the high degree of oil dependence, which ties the 
performance of the external balance to fluctuations in the price of 
crude, is crucial. Spain’s oil imports per unit of GDP are much 
higher than for the euro area as a whole (see panel 2). Were this 
difference halved over the coming years, the energy deficit would 
be reduced by around half a percentage point of GDP. Hence, the 
measures necessary to permanently reduce such external energy 
dependence must not be delayed.6
To avoid the growing demand for goods and services imports ham-
pering the correction of the external deficit during upswings it 
would also be desirable to reduce the high level of dependence on 
imports of goods with higher value-added and technology. Were 
the long-term income elasticity of Spanish imports to be reduced 
to similar levels to those observed in the large euro area countries, 
the favourable impact on the external balance of the above simula-
tions would be much greater.
BOX 5.2CHANNELS FOR CORRECTING THE SPANISH EXTERNAL DEFICIT (cont’d)
2011 2012
1  Gains in price-competitiveness of 1% in 2011 and in 2012 0.3 0.5
2  Growth in Spain's export markets of 1.4% in 2011 and 1.6% in 2012 0.3 0.6
3  Progressive reduction of net oil imports 0.2 0.5
TOTAL IMPACT 0.7 1.6
2   CUMULATIVE IMPACT ON SPAIN'S EXTERNAL DEFICIT OF DIFFERENT MEASURES 
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
% of GDP 
3  These weights are based on the import content of each of the final de-
mand components estimated using 2005 input-output tables.
4  To perform this simulation, the price elasticity of exports was increased, 
in line with the estimates at a more disaggregated level, and the re-
sponse of imports to changes in final demand was moderated.
5  Given the weight of unit labour costs, mark-ups and inputs in the export price 
formation process, this reduction in prices could be achieved through a further 
decrease of 1.5 pp in ULCs and mark-ups in each one of these two years.
6 The plan to step up energy saving and efficiency approved by the Coun-
cil of Ministers on 4 March includes a number of proposals to achieve an 
estimated total saving on energy imports of €2.3 billion per annum.
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BOX 5.2CHANNELS FOR CORRECTING THE SPANISH EXTERNAL DEFICIT (cont’d)
The simulations performed show that progress towards the 
achievement of external balance, which includes laying the 
foundations for curbing and reversing the upward trend in the 
negative IIP, requires ambitious measures on a number of 
fronts, to achieve more efficient price and wage setting, to in-
crease the productivity of firms and to reduce the dependence 
of the Spanish economy on imports, especially of energy. The 
simulations performed show that even if there were a rapid im-
provement in all these areas, which would reduce the external 
deficit in 2011 and 2012, the primary component would only be 
balanced in the latter year, so that the IIP would barely fall. 
That said, apart from reducing the external deficit, the above-
mentioned measures would boost activity, which would have 
favourable effects on financial market confidence in the growth 
capacity of the Spanish economy and on the sustainability of 
foreign debt.
was reduced (by 0.6 pp of GDP, to 5.4%), owing to the behaviour of households and fi-
nancial institutions, which cancelled out the improvement in the financial position of non-
financial corporations (which recorded net lending for the first time since 1996). Accord-
ingly, the decline in the nation’s net borrowing reflected the fall in that of general 
government (by 1.9 pp of GDP, to 9.2%). The correction of the budget deficit in the next 
few years is expected to be offset by a decline in private-sector net lending, so that the 
nation’s net borrowing will hardly be reduced. In this respect, more sustained progress in 
reducing the external deficit would require higher savings ratios or lower investment by 
households and firms.
The increase in the nation’s net borrowing was not reflected in the international investment 
position, owing to the impact of valuation effects. These effects resulted from the deprecia-
tion of the euro vis-à-vis the pound sterling and the US dollar and the fall in the prices of 
Spanish financial assets relative to foreign ones (in particular equities), and they made the 
net debit position fall by 4 pp of GDP in 2010, to stand at around 87%. In a year character-
ised by recurring strains on financial markets, net borrowing was mainly covered through 
portfolio investment in long-term fixed income, as a result of both the decline in the hold-
ings abroad of this type of security by residents in Spain and of investment by non-resi-
dents in government debt. Spain’s foreign debt (a variable that includes liabilities vis-à-vis 
non-residents that give rise to debt or interest payments, i.e. claims on Spain) fell by 2.8% 
of GDP in 2010, to 164%.
Despite its net borrowing, the 
Spanish economy’s net 
external indebtedness 
declined in 2010, owing to the 
positive impact of valuation 
effects
